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Comment 
Testing Drugs and Testing Limits: Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. and the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman 
Safe Harbor Provision 
Jonathan A. Hareid* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The limits of the law are often ill-defined or uncertain.  
Nevertheless, it is a familiar rule to impose liability for 
exceeding those limits, as Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked as 
a Supreme Court Justice.1  Holmes made this point about 
criminal law and probably would have been surprised to learn 
that in the future it would be relevant to drug research and 
development activities.  Yet in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision interpreting the scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe 
harbor provision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,2 
Justice Holmes’s observation has continuing vitality.  
 The Hatch-Waxman safe harbor provision creates a limited 
exemption from patent infringement liability for using  
patented inventions to develop and submit information under 
federal laws that regulate drugs.3  Integra involved Merck 
KGaA (Merck), an international pharmaceutical company, 
sponsoring research using certain peptides in various 
experiments to identify new drug candidates.4  Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra) sued Merck in federal district 
court, alleging that the use of the peptides infringed Integra’s 
                                                          
     ©     2006 Jonathan A. Hareid. 
      *     Ph.D. candidate in pharmacology, University of Minnesota; J.D. 
expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School. 
       1.     See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930). 
 2. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra II), 125 S. Ct. 
2372 (2005). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 4. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2377-79. 
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patents.5  A jury found patent infringement and awarded 
damages.6  On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
safe harbor did not protect Merck from liability because it did 
not apply to the type of activities at issue.7  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, 
holding that the Federal Circuit had adopted an improperly 
narrow interpretation of the safe harbor provision.8 
The safe harbor has perplexed courts and commentators 
because its broad language does not mesh well with the more 
limited scope suggested by its legislative history and purpose.  
While many believe the safe harbor was only intended to 
permit generic drug testing,9 courts have relied on the broad 
statutory language to give the safe harbor a broader scope.10  
The Supreme Court’s Integra decision continues the judicial 
trend of broadening the safe harbor by rendering it applicable 
to a wide array of new drug development activities.  The impact 
of Integra is evident in recent patent infringement cases 
dismissed in whole or in part based on the Court’s 
interpretation of the safe harbor.11  But while the safe harbor is 
broad post-Integra, it nevertheless has limits.  These limits 
remain somewhat vague after the decision and will most 
certainly be the subject of future debate and litigation. 
The case is an excellent anchor for examination and 
analysis of the safe harbor and the drug research process it 
governs.  Part II of this Comment provides background 
information on the science of drug research and development, 
the regulatory approval process, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments that include the safe harbor provision, and the 
interpretation courts have given the safe harbor.  Part III 
describes the Integra case in detail.  Part IV then analyzes the 
rationale and holding of Integra to show how the case affects 
                                                          
 5. See id. at 2379. 
 6. See id. at 2380. 
 7. See id.  
 8. See id. at 2384. 
        9.   See, e.g., Douglas C. Gardner, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck 
KGaA: Upholding Fundamental Principles of Patent Law, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 
523 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) 
(determining safe harbor includes medical device testing). 
 11. See, e.g., Benitec Austl. Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-0174 
JJF, 2005 WL 2415959 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2005); Classen Immunotherapies, 
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2005). 
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interpretation of the safe harbor provision, including 
consideration of the limits implied by the Court‘s opinion as 
applied to modern drug research.  Finally, Part V concludes by 
noting the challenge for Congress, the courts, and industries 
involved in drug research to ensure that implementation of this 
unique provision of law remains within reason given the 
different policy considerations it implicates. 
II.  THE COMPLEX SUBJECT MATTER OF INTEGRA 
The conflict in Integra emerged from the modern drug 
research and development process and the complex legal 
regime in which that process occurs.  This section provides 
background information on drug discovery, the FDA approval 
process, the patent regime, and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
including the safe harbor provision, and judicial interpretation 
of the safe harbor.   
A.  THE MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS 
Contemporary drug research is the culmination of 
scientific and technological progress in several fields.12  The 
science of pharmacology came into being as advances in 
chemistry and biology enabled understanding of the 
mechanisms by which drugs exert their effects on living 
systems.13  This understanding led to the generation of novel 
drugs based on knowledge of the biological targets on which 
drugs act.14  The rise of molecular biology and the completion of 
the human genome have yielded knowledge about the biological 
basis for disease that should increase both the quantity and 
quality of drug targets and potentially lead to individualized 
drug therapies.15   
Modern drug research benefits from biotechnology, a broad 
term for the practical use of biological materials such as genes, 
proteins, cells, tissues, and whole organisms.16  The products of 
biotechnology include research tools such as genes or gene 
                                                          
 12. See Jürgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective, 287 
SCIENCE 1960 (2000). 
 13. See id. at 1961. 
 14. See id. at 1961-62. 
 15. See, e.g., id.; David Golan, Building Better Medicines, NEWSWEEK, 
Summer 2005, at 37. 
 16. See Susanna Wu-Pong, An Overview of Biotechnology, in 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL DRUG DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (Susanna Wu-Pong 
& Yongyut Rojanasakul eds., 1999). 
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fragments, cell lines, clones and cloning tools, and laboratory 
equipment and methods, as well as therapeutic products 
including gene therapy, diagnostic tests, vaccines, and drugs 
such as insulin.17  Some fruits of biotechnology potentially 
straddle these categories and could be used either 
therapeutically in humans or as tools for further research and 
development.18  The biotech industry could be described as the 
discovery arm of the pharmaceutical industry, providing 
discoveries “upstream” that help drug companies develop 
“downstream” products such as drugs.19 
There are two basic approaches to discovering drugs.  One 
approach, which may be called screening, is more or less 
random and involves simply testing various molecules in hopes 
of finding one with a desired biological effect.20  The new 
paradigm of drug discovery, high-throughput screening, 
consists of testing large numbers of compounds in specific 
biological assays to identify compounds with activity.21  The 
other approach is to use rational methods to predict molecules 
with biological activity.  It is sometimes possible to design 
drugs based on knowledge of the structure of a potential drug 
target.22  Alternatively, if active compounds for a particular 
drug target are already known, these compounds can be used to 
design new drugs with similar activity or modify and improve 
active compounds identified by screening.23  Hence, drugs can 
                                                          
 17. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, 
Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology 
Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 149-50 (2004). 
 18. See Jian Xiao, Carving out a Biotechnology Research Tool Exception to 
the Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
23, 48 (2003). 
 19. See Wu-Pong, supra note 16, at 13; Drews, supra note 12, at 1960, 
1963; PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY PROFILE 2005, at v-vi (2005), 
http://www.phrma.org/files/2005IndustryReport.pdf. 
 20. See TERRY KENAKIN, MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY: A SHORT COURSE 
17-18 (1997). 
 21. See RUTH R. LEVINE, PHARMACOLOGY: DRUG ACTIONS AND REACTIONS 
431 (6th ed. 2000); Drews, supra note 12, at 1962. 
 22. See Amy C. Anderson, The Process of Structure-Based Drug Design, 10 
CHEMISTRY & BIOLOGY 787 (2003); William L. Jorgensen, The Many Roles of 
Computation in Drug Discovery, 303 SCIENCE 1813 (2004). 
 23. See Elliot M. Ross & Terry P. Kenakin, Pharmacodynamics: 
Mechanisms of Drug Action and the Relationship Between Drug Concentration 
and Effect, in GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF 
THERAPEUTICS 31, 32 (Joel G. Hardman & Lee E. Limbird eds., 10th ed. 2001). 
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be used to develop other drugs.24 
Both approaches to drug discovery require a multi-step 
process.  The first step in drug discovery is drug target 
selection, which consists of target identification, target 
assessment, and target validation.25  This step ensures that 
drug development efforts are directed at targets that meet 
criteria to maximize the probability of finding effective drugs.26  
After a drug target is validated, the process moves to the lead 
discovery and lead optimization phases.27  Lead discovery 
consists of finding molecules active at the target.28  Once 
compounds are identified, lead optimization involves subjecting 
the compounds to synthetic modification to optimize activity, 
selectivity, and bioavailability for the molecular target.29  Lead 
optimization ensures that the best compound is chosen for drug 
trials.30  The bottom line is that developing new drugs involves 
significant experimentation and trial-and-error even before 
extensive testing is begun in animals and humans. 
 
B.  DRUG TESTING AND THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS 
The FDA regulates drugs, medical devices, and biologics.  
The FDA’s authority to regulate medical products is based on 
various laws passed over the years, often in response to well-
publicized disasters involving medical products, perceived 
inadequacies with the existing regulatory regime, or 
technological innovation.31  The resulting regulatory structure 
is complex and specifically tailored to the unique attributes of 
drugs, devices, and biologics.32 
                                                          
 24. See id. at 31 (explaining that an understanding of drug action 
“provides the basis for . . . the design of new and superior therapeutic agents”). 
 25. See Ursula Egner et al., The Target Discovery Process, 6 
CHEMBIOCHEM 468, 468 (2005). 
 26. See id. at 478. 
 27. See id. at 471. 
 28. See KENAKIN, supra note 20, at 17. 
 29. See Terry Kenakin, Predicting Therapeutic Value in the Lead 
Optimization Phase of Drug Discovery, 2 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 
429, 429 (2003). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert J. Berlin, Can Regulation 
Be as Innovative as Science and Technology?  The FDA’s Regulation of 
Combination Products, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 619 (2005); Richard A. 
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996). 
 32. See Foote & Berlin, supra note 31, at 619. 
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The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)33 
requires the FDA to approve a new drug before it is released 
into interstate commerce.34  First, a drug manufacturer must 
apply for authorization to conduct clinical trials by submitting 
an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) that includes 
the results of preclinical tests that justify clinical testing in 
humans.35  Preclinical testing data must include extensive 
pharmacology and toxicology information based on in vitro and 
animal studies.36  After clinical testing has begun, a drug 
manufacturer must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to 
get approval to market the new drug.37  The NDA must include 
the results of clinical studies that show the drug is both safe 
and effective for use,38 as well as preclinical and clinical studies 
that demonstrate the drug’s efficacy, toxicity, and 
pharmacological properties.39 
Hence, obtaining FDA approval to market a new drug 
requires two phases of testing, a preclinical phase and a clinical 
phase.  Pursuant to FDA regulations, clinical testing generally 
is further divided into three phases.40  Phase I studies involve 
about twenty to eighty human subjects and aim to gain 
information on a drug’s pharmacological effects, metabolism, 
side effects, and pharmacokinetics.41  Phase II studies involve 
several hundred research participants who may benefit from 
the drug and evaluate the drug’s effectiveness and short-term 
toxicity and side effects.42  Phase III trials involve several 
hundred to several thousand individuals and include additional 
controlled and non-controlled studies to evaluate the safety and 
                                                          
 33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). 
 34. See id. § 355(a). 
 35. See id. § 355(i)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(a) (2005). 
 36. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2005).  The pharmacological data should 
include information on the drug’s effects, mechanism of action, and absorption, 
distribution, metabolism, and excretion, if known.  Id. § 312.23(a)(8)(i).  The 
toxicological data may include information on acute, subacute, and chronic 
toxicity, the drug’s effect on reproduction or the developing fetus, in vitro 
toxicity tests, and any special toxicity resulting from mode of administration 
or conditions of use.  See id. § 312.23(a)(8)(ii)(a). 
 37. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2005). 
 38. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(a). 
 39. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(2), (5) (requiring preclinical and clinical 
studies). 
 40. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2005). 
 41. See id. § 312.21(a)(1). 
 42. See id. § 312.21(b). 
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effectiveness of the drug.  These studies also determine the 
benefit-risk relationship and appropriate information for 
labeling.43 
The drug research and development process is long and 
expensive.  The total time involved in discovering a new drug 
and getting it approved runs between three and twenty years, 
with an average of about 8.5 years.44  The total cost of getting a 
new drug to market has been estimated to be as high as $897 
million in year 2000 U.S. dollars.45   
C.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE PATENT STATUTE 
AND FDCA 
The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”46  Congress has 
implemented this power by creating the patent system.47  A 
patent enables an inventor to prevent others from making, 
using, selling, or importing the invention in the United 
States.48  This exclusive right lasts for twenty years from the 
date of filing of the patent application.49  The patent system’s 
purpose is to encourage investment in innovation by allowing 
patent holders to capture some of the economic benefit from 
their inventions.50  Patent protection is thought to encourage 
the development of new drugs.  A study of new drug approvals 
in different countries has shown that countries with significant 
patent protection had a larger number of new drugs approved 
and more pharmaceutical research and development activity 
than countries with less patent protection.51 
While the patent system is thought to encourage 
                                                          
 43. See id. § 312.21(c). 
 44. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising 
Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG 
DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004).  The Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) maintains that the total time averages 
14.2 years in recent decades.  See id. 
 45. See id. at 423-26. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). 
 48. See id. § 154(a)(1). 
 49. See id. § 154(a)(2). 
 50. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1 (3d ed. 
2004). 
 51. See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 44, at 421. 
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innovation, it does not generally permit the unauthorized use of 
a patented invention in research to modify, improve upon, 
design around, or provide a substitute for the invention, 
although scholars have argued for such an experimental use 
exemption for some time.52  While there is a judicially-created 
experimental use exemption, courts have been unwilling to 
expand it beyond a very narrow scope.  The common law 
experimental use exemption only applies to uses “for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry” and does not cover acts in furtherance of legitimate 
business, even if the infringer is a non-profit institution such as 
a university.53  
The time involved in getting a new drug developed and 
approved poses a special problem for patent protection of new 
drugs.  Usually a new drug is not approved by the FDA until 
long after the patent has issued.54  The drug manufacturer 
cannot begin to market the drug without FDA approval, so the 
long FDA approval process effectively shortens the length of 
market exclusivity for new drugs.55 
The intersection of the FDCA with the patent system also 
created problems for drug manufacturers wanting to market a 
generic version of a drug once the patent expired.  First, before 
1984, drug manufacturers had to go through the same lengthy 
FDA approval process to market a generic version of an already 
approved drug.56  This seemed like wasteful duplication.  
Second, a drug manufacturer could not begin testing a patented 
drug until the patent expired.57  While drug companies may 
                                                          
     52.    See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); see 
also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing for a patent doctrine analogous to fair 
use in copyright law which would include, but not be limited to, experimental 
use of an invention). 
     53.    See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
 54. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650. 
 55. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714. 
 56. See id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2688; H.R. REP. NO. 
98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1585) 
2647, 2649. 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
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have believed such testing was protected by the common law 
experimental use exemption, this notion was squarely rejected 
in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.58  The 
result was in effect an extension of the patent term because it 
would be years after the patent expired before a generic version 
would be approved for marketing.  Thus, the market exclusivity 
for a patented drug was distorted both at the front end of the 
patent term because of required FDA approval, and at the back 
end because of the prohibition on testing during the patent 
period.59 
Congress acted to remedy these problems by passing the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.60  The law 
changed the Patent Act and FDCA in three important respects.  
First, it enabled a drug manufacturer to file an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA).61  The ANDA enables a drug 
manufacturer to piggyback on the safety and effectiveness data 
submitted for a previously approved drug, simplifying the 
approval process of generic drugs.62  Second, the law permitted 
patent term extension for products subject to a regulatory 
approval process before marketing, including human drugs, 
animal drugs, medical devices, and food and color additives.63  
This provision enables the manufacturer to recoup part of the 
patent term that is lost during product testing and regulatory 
                                                                                                                            
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689. 
 58. 733 F.2d 858, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the common law 
experimental use exemption to patent infringement did not cover testing of a 
patented drug for purposes of seeking FDA approval), superseded by statute, 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000), 35 
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).   
 59. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-71 (1990). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355 (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).  For a history leading 
up to the law’s passage, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 187 (1999). 
 61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 62. Generally, the ANDA must show that the indications for the new drug 
have been approved for the previously approved drug, that the active 
ingredient or ingredients are the same as for the approved drug, that the route 
of administration, dosage form, and strength are the same as the active drug, 
that the new drug is bioequivalent to the approved drug, and that the 
proposed labeling for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for 
the approved drug.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v).   
 63. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f). 
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review.64  Finally, the law included a provision, commonly 
referred to as the safe harbor provision, which permits some 
otherwise-infringing uses of patented inventions in producing 
information required for FDA approval of a product, and which 
in current form reads as follows: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development 
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.65 
The legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act contains 
several references to the safe harbor provision, and the 
committee reports suggest that the primary purpose is to 
facilitate approval of generic drugs.66  The safe harbor does so 
by permitting a drug company to experiment with a patented 
drug for the purpose of seeking FDA approval.67  Moreover, 
even when no application for approval is submitted, the 
experimenter is protected so long as the experiments are done 
                                                          
 64. The patent can be extended for half of the time spent in clinical 
testing and all of the time spent while the FDA reviews the product 
application.  See id. § 156(c)(2), (g)(1)(B). 
 65. Id. § 271(e)(1). 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648 (stating that safe harbor provision provides that it is 
not an act of patent infringement for a generic drug maker to use a patented 
drug in preparation for seeking FDA approval); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 
5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689 (indicating that a generic 
manufacturer may obtain a supply of a patented drug and conduct tests for 
purposes of FDA approval); id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 
(stating that bill permitted only limited testing “so that generic manufacturers 
can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute”); id. at 29, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2713 (anticipating benefits to consumers from earlier 
availability of generic substitutes); id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2714 (stating that generic manufacturer may not market a patented drug 
during the life of the patent, but only test the drug for purposes of submitting 
data to the FDA). 
 67. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678 (“The purpose . . . is to establish that 
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare 
for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a 
patent infringement.”); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2711 (stating that provision will reverse the holding 
of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co.); id. at 30, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 (stating that safe harbor provision is necessitated 
by the significant regulatory period for drugs to prevent artificial extension of 
patents); id. (suggesting provision would be analogous to fair use doctrine in 
copyright law). 
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to determine whether an application will be submitted.68  
Congress seemed to recognize that most patents falling under 
the safe harbor provision covered drugs or other FDA-regulated 
products.69  It is evident that Congress did not intend to 
significantly reduce the commercial value of any patent 
affected by the safe harbor provision.70 
D.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION 
The safe harbor provision has been widely interpreted by 
federal courts.  Numerous commentators have discussed 
judicial interpretation of the safe harbor provision in detail.71  
The two main interpretive problems are the types of patents 
covered and the scope of activities permitted by the safe harbor 
provision. 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,72 is a seminal U.S. 
Supreme Court case concerning the types of patented 
inventions within the safe harbor’s meaning.  In this case, 
Medtronic, Inc. was testing and marketing a heart defibrillator 
of its competitor, Eli Lilly & Co.  Medtronic argued that this 
testing and marketing fell under the safe harbor provision as 
the activity was “reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” under the FDCA.”73  In reaching its 
decision, the Court interpreted the phrase “patented invention” 
to include “all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.”74  
Moreover, the Court construed the phrase “under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” to refer 
to an entire statute, not just an isolated statutory provision.75  
Declining to limit the safe harbor’s scope based on the 
legislative history, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is not the law 
                                                          
 68. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678. 
 69. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 61 n.20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2721 n.20 (“It is important to note that most patent 
holders affected . . . will also receive a benefit from the bill in the form of 
patent term extension.”). 
 70. See id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 (“The patent 
holder retains the right to exclude others from the major commercial 
marketplace during the life of the patent.  Thus, the nature of the interference 
with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Safe 
Harbor, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475 (2002); Xiao, supra note 18. 
 72. 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 73. See id. at 664. 
 74. Id. at 665. 
 75. See id. at 665-69. 
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that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly 
mentioned in its legislative history.”76  Instead, the Court 
reasoned from the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act that the 
safe harbor provision was part of a package that included the 
patent extension provision.  Accordingly, since the extension 
provision explicitly included medical devices, food additives, 
and color additives, as well as drugs, all of these products were 
also included in the safe harbor provision.77  The Court stated 
that the Act’s apparent purpose was to eliminate distortions to 
patent terms for FDA-regulated products caused by the 
prohibitions on marketing the products during the regulatory 
review period and testing the products during the patent 
term.78  On this basis, the Court reasoned that excluding 
medical devices from the safe harbor would thwart this purpose 
because the devices were eligible for patent term extensions.79  
The Court noted, however, that some products may be eligible 
for patent term extension but not fall within the safe harbor, 
and vice versa.80 
In the wake of Eli Lilly, courts have generally broadly 
interpreted the scope of patented inventions falling under the 
safe harbor.  For example, in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,81 the 
Federal Circuit held that medical devices not eligible for patent 
term extension nevertheless fell under the safe harbor 
provision.82  The court contended that under Eli Lilly, 
symmetry in scope between the patent extension and safe 
harbor provisions was preferred but not required, and that the 
inventions at issue fell under the plain language of the safe 
harbor provision.83 
By contrast, in Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, 
Inc.,84 the patents at issue covered a process for activating 
bovine egg cells and a culture media for growing the cells, both 
of which could be used to create transgenic cattle.85  Such cattle 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 669 n.2 (quoting Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 
115 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. See id. at 669-74. 
 78. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-71. 
 79. Id. at 672. 
 80. Id. at 671-72. 
 81. 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 82. Id. at 1029. 
 83. See id. 
 84. 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 85. Id. at 969-70. 
HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:36:29 PM 
2006] TESTING DRUGS AND TESTING LIMITS 725 
potentially could produce milk containing the transgene 
product, which would be subject to FDA approval.86  The 
Infigen court held that use of these patents did not fall within 
the safe harbor because neither patent was subject to the 
patent term extension provision.87  This holding is in direct 
conflict with Abtox because the Infigen court held that 
symmetry in scope between patent term extension and the safe 
harbor provisions is required. 
An important case construing the uses of patented 
inventions permitted by the safe harbor is Intermedics, Inc. v. 
Ventritex, Inc.88  The patent at issue covered a medical device 
that Ventritex was using to generate data for an FDA 
application, and Intermedics argued that the safe harbor did 
not apply because Ventritex intended to commercialize the 
device.89  The Northern District of California held that the 
scope of permissible activity concerns the actual use of the 
patented invention, not the purpose of the alleged infringer.90  
The court then articulated a test for determining permissible 
use that has since been widely used by courts: 
[W]ould it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in 
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that 
the “use” in question would contribute (relatively directly) to the 
generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in 
the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the 
product?91 
Following the Intermedics decision, courts have held that 
the safe harbor provision permits a variety of uses of patented 
inventions.  For example, display of a patented medical device 
at conferences was within the safe harbor because the display 
was necessary to recruit investigators to conduct clinical 
trials.92  Use of a patented protein by a competitor as a 
reference standard to evaluate an alternative manufacturing 
method was also within the safe harbor because the FDA 
presumably would have to approve the alternative 
manufacturing method.93  In addition, conducting an in vivo 
                                                          
 86. See id. at 974. 
 87. See id. at 980. 
 88. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 89. See id. at 1273. 
 90. See id. at 1275. 
 91. Id. at 1280. 
 92. See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 
1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 93. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 
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purity test of that protein fell within the safe harbor because 
the test was necessary to confirm the purity of the product for 
use in clinical trials that would be submitted to the FDA.94  
Simply producing a commercial-size quantity of a patented 
product has also been held to be within the safe harbor because 
of the need to demonstrate suitable manufacturing capability 
for FDA approval.95  By contrast, stockpiling a large batch of a 
drug in evident preparation to sell immediately following FDA 
approval was outside the scope of the safe harbor.96 
Another notable case is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,97 which is significant because it involved 
new drug development activities and portended some of the 
issues in Integra.  Rhône-Poulenc Rorer held patents on 
compounds that were intermediates in the synthesis of the 
drug paclitaxel.98  Bristol-Myers Squibb used these 
intermediates in basic research to develop a structure-activity 
relationship database which in turn was used to screen more 
than 1000 compounds for biological activity, and also in studies 
to create analogs of paclitaxel by chemical modification.99  
Citing the Intermedics test, the District Court of Massachusetts 
found these research activities to fall within the safe harbor.100  
The court rejected the patent holder’s argument that the safe 
harbor should not apply until a particular drug candidate is 
selected for further study or filed with the FDA, responding 
that this would prevent competitors from being able to 
experiment with a patented drug to create new and improved 
drugs.101  The court reasoned that if the safe harbor only 
applied after a particular drug candidate was selected or filed 
with the FDA, the safe harbor would never be reached because 
the underlying research and development required to reach 
that stage could not be conducted.102  The court held that the 
                                                                                                                            
109 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 94. See id. at 109-10. 
 95. See NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 206 (D.N.J. 
1994). 
 96. See Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (D. Mass. 
1996). 
 97. No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
 98. Id. at *1. 
 99. See id. at *4-5. 
 100. See id. at *6. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
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safe harbor applies to preliminary research that may not 
directly yield information that would be submitted to the FDA, 
as long as the research facilitates or would be useful in 
generating information that could be submitted.103 
It is evident from these cases that the courts have given 
the safe harbor a wide berth.  The safe harbor has been held to 
protect the use of a variety of patented products, and the range 
of activities permitted is similarly broad.  While there is 
precedent for the proposition that the scope of the safe harbor 
is not unlimited, it is not readily apparent where the outer 
limits lie. 
III.  TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE SAFE HARBOR: 
INTEGRA 
The Supreme Court recently visited the issue of the limits 
of the safe harbor in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd.104  The case involved the international drug manufacturer 
Merck KGaA (Merck), which was sponsoring various 
experiments aimed at developing new drugs using certain 
peptides.  Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra), a competitor of 
Merck, claimed these peptides were covered by its patents.105   
The facts of the case and the opinions of the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court highlight the issues and concerns 
associated with different interpretations of the safe harbor. 
A.  FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Integra holds five patents related to a short tri-peptide 
sequence known as the RGD peptide.106  The RGD peptide 
promotes cell adhesion to substrates in vivo and in vitro by 
interacting with a particular class of receptors on cell surface 
proteins called integrins.107  Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist at 
the Scripps Institute (Scripps), discovered that blocking these 
receptors inhibits angiogenesis, a process involved in various 
pathologies.108 
Merck agreed to collaborate with Scripps to test 
angiogenesis inhibitors as drug candidates and ultimately 
                                                          
 103. Bristol-Meyers, 2001 WL 1512597 at *7.  
 104. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 105. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2377-79. 
 106. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., v. Merck KGaA (Integra I), 331 F.3d 
860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. at 863. 
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submit an IND to the FDA.109  Pursuant to the agreement, Dr. 
Cheresh conducted research using various RGD peptides 
supplied by Merck.110  The research consisted of in vitro and in 
vivo experiments on the RGD peptides to determine their 
efficacy, specificity, toxicity, mechanism of action, and 
pharmacokinetics to find suitable candidates to develop as 
drugs to inhibit angiogenesis.111  Scripps also conducted 
research to find other compounds that would have a similar 
effect as the RGD peptides.  For these experiments, the RGD 
peptides were used as positive controls against which to 
measure the efficacy of the compounds studied.112  Merck 
eventually took steps to guide one of the RGD peptides through 
the FDA approval process.113 
While these studies were ongoing, Integra filed a patent 
infringement suit in federal district court against Merck, 
Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for use of the RGD peptides.114  The 
district court’s jury instruction essentially recited the 
Intermedics test to determine whether the safe harbor shielded 
Merck from patent infringement liability.115  The jury 
instruction provided that information did not have to be 
actually submitted to the FDA for the safe harbor to apply.116  
The jury determined that the safe harbor was not applicable, 
found patent infringement by the defendants, and awarded $15 
million in damages.117  In response to post-trial motions, the 
district court dismissed the claims against Scripps and Dr. 
Cheresh.  The district court, however, affirmed the damage 
award against Merck because the trial evidence was sufficient 
to show that the connection between the research activities and 
FDA review was too attenuated for the safe harbor provision to 
apply.118 
                                                          
 109. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 2378-79. 
 112. See id. at 2379. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.   
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 2380. 
 118. See id. 
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B.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISION 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
Merck filed a timely appeal with the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals asserting, among other things, error in the district 
court’s interpretation of the safe harbor provision.119  The 
court’s analysis began with a discussion of the safe harbor 
provision’s legislative history.120  The court concluded that 
based on the legislative history the provision was intended to 
permit testing of generic drugs and interference with the rights 
of the patent holder was intended to be minimal.121  
Furthermore, the court determined the word “solely” in the 
statutory text limits the extent of activities protected by the 
safe harbor.122  “[R]easonably related to the development and 
submission of information” also limits the scope of the provision 
to activities that produce information for the FDA, although the 
court conceded that this includes some activities that are not 
experiments.123 
The court found that the research Merck had sponsored 
“was not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but 
only general biomedical research to identify new 
pharmaceutical compounds.”124  Concluding that the FDA was 
not interested in “the hunt for drugs that may or may not later 
undergo clinical testing” for approval and that the agency “does 
not require information about drugs other than the compound” 
included in an IND, the court determined that the work Merck 
had sponsored “was not ‘solely for uses reasonably related’ to 
clinical testing for FDA.”125 
The court stated that in this context the safe harbor 
“simply does not globally embrace all experimental activity that 
at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA 
approval process.”126  Hence, the court determined that the 
provision does not cover all stages of the development of new 
                                                          
 119. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 
2372 (2005). 
 120. See id. at 864-65. 
 121. See id. at 865. 
 122. See id. at 866. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Integra I, 331 F.3d at 866. 
 126. Id. at 867. 
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drugs.127  The court further concluded that extending the safe 
harbor to all stages of new drug development would result in 
more than minimal encroachment on the rights of patent 
holders and potentially vitiate the value of patented research 
tools, which derive their primary commercial value from use in 
research.128  The court feared that an overly expansive safe 
harbor “would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for 
some categories of biotechnological inventions.”129  For these 
reasons, the court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of 
the safe harbor provision.130 
2.  The Dissent 
Judge Newman dissented from the court’s opinion.131  She 
discussed the research conducted by Merck and Scripps and the 
common law experimental use exemption.132  She argued that 
because the research was aimed at understanding, improving 
upon, or modifying the patented subject matter, the 
experimental use exception applied.133  She agreed with the 
majority that the safe harbor provision did not include all 
stages of new drug development, but she contended that the 
experimental use exception covered the research not included 
in the safe harbor and that the safe harbor “took up where the 
research exemption left off.”134  Regarding the court’s fear that 
exemption from patent infringement liability would diminish 
the value of patented research tools, she maintained that use of 
a research tool is different from study of the tool itself, and thus 
that the RGD peptides were not used as research tools by 
Merck and Scripps.135 
                                                          
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 868.  The court went on to determine that the district court 
correctly concluded that the RGD peptides used by Merck and Scripps fell 
within the claims of Integra’s patents.  See id. at 868-69.  The court also 
analyzed the jury’s damage award and held that it was not supported by the 
evidence.  See id. at 869-72.  These holdings are not pertinent to the subject of 
this comment and thus are not discussed further. 
 131. See Integra I, 331 F.3d at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 132. See id. at 873-76.  She referred to the exemption as the “common law 
research exemption.”  Id. at 874. 
 133. See id. at 876. 
 134. See id. at 878. 
 135. See id. 
HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:36:29 PM 
2006] TESTING DRUGS AND TESTING LIMITS 731 
C.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
Federal Circuit’s construction of the safe harbor provision.136  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia quoted the 
statutory language and stated the safe harbor “provides a wide 
berth for the use of patented drugs in activities related to the 
federal regulatory process.”137  Based on the text, the Court 
held that the safe harbor applies to activities reasonably 
related to the development and submission of any information 
under the FDCA; thus, preclinical studies of patented 
compounds were included within the safe harbor.138  The Court 
noted that the statutory language does not limit the phases of 
research or types of submissions included within the safe 
harbor.139 
Addressing Integra’s argument that only preclinical 
studies pertaining to safety of drugs in humans were of interest 
to the FDA, the Court pointed to the FDA’s requirement that 
INDs contain information about a drug’s pharmacological, 
pharmacokinetic, toxicological, and biological qualities in 
animals.140  The Court maintained that such information 
generally must be obtained through preclinical in vitro and in 
vivo studies.141  Furthermore, the FDA requires an IND to 
include information that enables the agency to make a risk-
benefit assessment on whether to allow clinical trials, and 
“[s]uch information necessarily includes preclinical studies of a 
drug’s efficacy in achieving particular results.”142 
Turning to the Federal Circuit’s rationale, the Court 
rejected the notion that the safe harbor applies only to 
experiments actually included in an FDA submission.143  The 
Court noted that scientific testing is a trial-and-error process.  
Drug companies generally do not know in advance which 
experiments will be successful.  Hence, they do not know in 
advance which experiments will be appropriate to include in an 
                                                          
 136. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005). 
 137. Id. at 2380.  The language of the safe harbor provision, codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000), is quoted at note 65 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 2381 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5) (2005)). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 2382-83. 
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FDA submission.144  Referring to the “reasonably related” 
language in the statute, the Court posited that the relationship 
of an experiment “to the ‘development and submission of 
information’ to the FDA does not become more attenuated (or 
less reasonable) simply because the data from that experiment 
are left out of the submission that is ultimately passed along to 
the FDA.”145  Rather, the safe harbor leaves room for 
“experimentation and failure” in drug development and 
approval.146  Moreover, the Court stated, drug companies also 
face uncertainty about what research to include in an IND or 
NDA to get FDA approval.147 
The Court further reasoned that limiting the safe harbor to 
testing on a compound actually included in an FDA submission 
would effectively limit the safe harbor to generic drug approval, 
because the only way researchers will know for certain that 
experiments on an identical compound will be appropriate to 
include in an FDA submission is if the compound is already 
approved.148  Referring again to the statutory text, the Court 
rejected the claim that the safe harbor is limited to generic 
drug approval.149  Rather, the safe harbor protects “all uses of 
patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of 
developing information for submission under any federal law 
regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs.”150  
Addressing the Federal Circuit’s concern about depriving 
patented research tools of much of their value, the Court 
expressly declined to decide whether use of such tools fell under 
the safe harbor, claiming that it was evident from the record 
that the RGD peptides were not used as research tools.151 
The Court agreed with the Federal Circuit’s assertion that 
the safe harbor does not cover all activity that may lead to an 
FDA approval process.152  In particular, “[b]asic scientific 
                                                          
 144. See Integra II, 125 S.Ct. at 2382-83. 
 145. Id. at 2383. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2005) (noting that the amount of 
information that must be submitted in an IND for a particular drug depends 
on several factors)). 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)). 
 150. Integra II, 125 S.Ct. at 2383 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 
496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990)). 
 151. See id. at 2382 n.7. 
 152. See id. at 2382. 
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research on a particular compound, performed without the 
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that 
the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the 
researcher intends to induce” does not satisfy the “reasonably 
related” standard set by the statutory language.153  However, 
the Court posited that the safe harbor applies when a 
compound is chosen based on particular expectations about its 
mechanism of action and effect and used in research aimed at 
producing the type of information appropriate to submit to the 
FDA: 
[W]here a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a 
patented compound may work, through a particular biological 
process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the 
compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to 
include in a submission to the FDA, that use is “reasonably related” 
to the “development and submission of information under . . . Federal 
law.”154 
The Court indicated that the jury instruction given by the 
district court was “consistent with, if less detailed than, the 
construction . . . that we adopt today.”155  Because the Court 
found that the Federal Circuit used a flawed interpretation of 
the safe harbor provision when it rejected Merck’s challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict, the 
Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.156  The Federal Circuit has 
since reinstated the appeal with the original panel of judges 
and ordered the parties to submit new briefs that take account 
of the Supreme Court opinion.157  As of the printing of this 
article no decision has been reported. 
IV.  ANALYZING INTEGRA: THE SAFE HARBOR AND ITS 
LIMITS 
A.  INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR AFTER INTEGRA 
The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court opinions in 
Integra reflect differing views of the Hatch-Waxman safe 
harbor provision.  A similar dichotomy pervades the academic 
literature, with some commentators arguing that the safe 
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2383 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)). 
 155. Id. at 2384.   
 156. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2384.   
   157.  See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421 F.3d 1289, 1289 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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harbor should be restricted to generic drug testing or clinical 
testing, and others contending that the safe harbor should 
protect a broader range of activities and cover a wider variety 
of patents.158  These distinct views arise from different 
interpretations of statutory text, structure, and legislative 
history.  The dichotomy also arises in part from distinct policy 
considerations evident in the Integra opinions: the Federal 
Circuit approached its task with a view toward the dangers of 
an overly broad safe harbor while the Supreme Court 
approached the same task emphasizing the pitfalls of a narrow 
safe harbor.  The cogency of the arguments in both opinions 
testifies to the merits of both positions: the safe harbor should 
be interpreted neither too broadly nor too narrowly.  While 
Integra binds future courts to a broad view of the safe harbor, 
these courts should recognize that the opinion describes limits 
on the scope of activities permitted, and that the opinion is not 
inconsistent with, and implicitly supports, limits on the types of 
patented inventions that may be used within the safe harbor. 
The Court invoked the statutory text for the proposition 
that the safe harbor “provides a wide berth for the use of 
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory 
process.”159  The plain language of the provision indeed sweeps 
very broadly.  The provision uses the term “patented invention” 
rather than “patented drug” or “patented drug already 
approved for use.”160  The current statutory language 
specifically excludes new animal drugs or veterinary biological 
products prepared by site specific genetic manipulation 
techniques, suggesting that other products are not excluded 
from the safe harbor’s scope.161  Nor does the statutory 
language that follows impose such limits, at least not directly. 
While the safe harbor restricts the use of patented inventions 
to the production of information “under a Federal law which 
                                                          
 158. Compare, e.g., Gardner, supra note 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit 
was correct to narrow the scope of the safe harbor), with Alison Ladd, Integra 
v. Merck: Effects on the Cost and Innovation of New Drug Products, 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 311 (2005) (arguing in the wake of the Federal Circuit decision that a 
broad safe harbor is necessary to control drug costs and encourage new drug 
development and innovation). 
 159. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
   161.   See id.  When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, the natural 
inference is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and limited the 
statute to the exceptions set forth.  See United States. v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 
58 (2000). 
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regulates . . . drugs or veterinary biological products,”162 this 
seems like an unlikely way to limit the term “patented 
invention.”  It would have been more natural to do so by 
qualifying or elaborating on the patented inventions covered.163       
The uses of patented inventions permitted by the safe 
harbor are governed by the phrase “solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” 
under a federal law regulating drugs or veterinary biological 
products.164  The word “solely” could be construed to restrict the 
scope of permissible activities as the Federal Circuit suggested, 
but this reading would be in tension with the further modifier 
“reasonably related,” which suggests some leeway in what is 
permitted.  The fact that the statute includes the word “uses” 
instead of “purposes” suggests that the inquiry is an objective 
one focused on the actual uses to which the invention is put, 
not on the subjective purposes of the user.165  The phrase 
“reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information” seems to encompass activities that produce the 
type of information included in FDA submissions such as INDs 
and NDAs, even if the activities do not in fact produce 
information that is actually included.  Moreover, the term 
“reasonably related” indicates that some activities that do not 
directly produce such information are included.  Although the 
modifier “reasonably” also limits the range of these activities, 
courts after Integra are bound by the Court’s refusal “to read 
the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement so narrowly as to render . 
. . protection of activities leading to FDA approval for all drugs 
illusory.”166 
In holding that the safe harbor extends to new drug 
development activities, the Integra Court implicitly rejected a 
limit to the safe harbor’s scope arguably implied by the 
structure of the statutory scheme created by the Hatch-
Waxman amendments.  The Eli Lilly Court reasoned that the 
Hatch-Waxman provisions aim to eliminate the distortions in 
marketing exclusivity conferred by patent terms for products 
subject to FDA approval, and hence patent term extension and 
the safe harbor provisions should both generally apply to the 
                                                          
   162.    See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
   163.    See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1990). 
 164. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 165. For an excellent elaboration of this point, see Intermedics, Inc. v. 
Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 166. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005). 
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same products.167  On this view, the safe harbor exists to 
permit testing and regulatory approval of an otherwise 
infringing product, such as a generic drug or similar medical 
device, so that commercial marketing can begin as soon as the 
patent on the pioneer product expires.  This logic does not 
extend to new drug development because a new drug by 
definition differs from existing drugs.  Because a new drug 
differs from existing drugs, a new drug does not prevent 
distortion in marketing exclusivity at the back end of the 
patent term for these existing drugs.  On the basis of the 
structural argument in Eli Lilly, a court before Integra could 
have concluded that the safe harbor does not extend to new 
drug development activities.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s 
constrained view of permissible activities in Integra was 
partially based on the proposition that the safe harbor allows 
for pre-expiration testing of a patented drug already on the 
market to facilitate generic approval.168 
This structural argument, however, was only part of the 
rationale in Eli Lilly.  The Court also rested its holding on the 
plain language of the safe harbor provision.169  Before Integra, 
courts have differed over whether the safe harbor’s scope is to 
be determined by its plain language or by its purpose as 
indicated by the statutory structure.  Some courts have focused 
on the plain language to extend the safe harbor beyond the 
scope suggested by the structural argument in Eli Lilly.170  At 
least one court, however, has relied on the structural argument 
to hold that the safe harbor only applies to products eligible for 
patent term extension.171 
The Integra Court resolved this question by resting its 
holding on the statutory language, which on its face does not 
limit the safe harbor to generic product testing.172  The 
reasoning of Integra may make future courts less likely to read 
limitations into the safe harbor based on statutory structure or 
                                                          
 167. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-74 (1990).   
 168. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 866-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. 
Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 169. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665-69. 
 170. See, e.g., Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (holding that the safe harbor applies to testing of medical devices not 
eligible for patent term extension). 
 171. See Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 
(W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 172. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383 (2005). 
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purpose, although Integra does not render these considerations 
illegitimate.  The Integra opinion resists taking the safe harbor 
to the limit that a literal reading of the statutory language 
would permit.  Thus, Integra should be read as endorsing a 
broader statutory purpose than generic drug testing or the 
prevention of patent term distortion; it should not be read as an 
outright abandonment of purpose-based interpretation in favor 
of a literal statutory reading. 
Legislative history also did not sway the Integra Court to 
adopt a more constrained view of the safe harbor’s scope.  The 
Court did not cite or mention the legislative history of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  In contrast, the Eli Lilly Court 
mentioned, without much elaboration, that the legislative 
history “sheds no clear light” on interpretation of the safe 
harbor.173  The reason the legislative history was not examined 
more thoroughly may be that both the Eli Lilly and Integra 
opinions were authored by Justice Scalia, who has argued that 
judges should not rely on legislative history in statutory 
interpretation.174  Several commentators have pointed to the 
legislative history in arguing that Congress intended the safe 
harbor to only protect testing and approval of generic versions 
of patented drugs already on the market.175  In Integra, the 
Federal Circuit referred to legislative history concluding that 
the safe harbor should be construed narrowly.176  However, 
because the Supreme Court in Integra determined that the safe 
harbor encompasses new drug development activities, future 
courts are constrained from using legislative history to limit 
the safe harbor to generic product testing, although they may 
be able to limit the safe harbor’s scope in other respects based 
on legislative history. 
The realities of drug testing and approval are prominent in 
the Court’s interpretation of the safe harbor, and rightly so.  
Based on the trial-and-error nature of the drug discovery and 
development process, the Court appropriately reasoned that 
the safe harbor must be wide enough to accommodate 
                                                          
   173.    See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669.   
 174. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 175. See, e.g., Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) Shelter Pioneer Drug Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 643 
(1998); Gardner, supra note 9. 
 176. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 
2372 (2005). 
HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:36:29 PM 
738 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
experimentation and failure.177  The safe harbor must also be 
wide enough to cover the entire range of activities that produce 
the extensive safety and effectiveness information the FDA 
requires, which means more than just clinical trials.178  The 
pragmatic message for future courts is that interpretation of 
the safe harbor should not be divorced from the realities of the 
subject matter the law governs. 
The Integra Court formulated a view of the safe harbor 
best described as a special experimental use exemption for 
using patented drugs and potential drugs in research to be 
submitted for federal approval (as opposed to a more general 
experimental use exemption, which would not be limited to 
approval activities for FDA-regulated products).  The Court 
repeatedly referred to the safe harbor as protecting the use of 
patented compounds in research to produce information for an 
FDA application.179  The safe harbor applies when the 
researcher has a reasonable basis for believing that a 
compound has a particular mechanism of action and effect and 
uses that compound in research that, if successful, would be 
appropriate for FDA submission.180  Hence, Integra is most 
consistent with the view that the safe harbor, at its core, 
protects the use of patented compounds in research to develop a 
particular drug, be it a generic version of an already approved 
drug or an entirely new drug.  Because the safe harbor extends 
                                                          
 177. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2382-84.  While the Court did not cite 
legislative history, the committee reports for the Hatch-Waxman amendments 
support the Court’s view that the safe harbor is not limited to activities that 
produce information actually submitted to the FDA.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-
857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678 (“The 
information which can be developed under this provision is the type which is 
required to obtain approval of the drug.  A party which develops such 
information, but decides not to submit an application for approval, is protected 
as long as the development was done to determine whether or not an 
application for approval would be sought.”). 
 178. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2381. 
 179. Id. at 2380 (stating the safe harbor “provides a wide berth for the use 
of patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory process”); id. 
(the safe harbor “necessarily includes preclinical studies of patented 
compounds that are appropriate for submission to the FDA”); id. at 2382 
(noting the safe harbor “is sufficiently broad to protect the use of patented 
compounds” in experiments not ultimately submitted to the FDA); id. at 2383 
(stating the safe harbor covers “all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably 
related’ to the process of developing information for submission under any 
federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs”). 
 180. See id. at 2383. 
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to other FDA-regulated products such as medical devices,181 
Integra’s holding can be generalized as protecting the use of 
patented products or potential products subject to FDA review 
in research to develop and approve competing products, 
whether the same as or substantially similar to the original 
product or substantially different from the original product. 
Note that while in this view the safe harbor is not limited 
to generic drug testing or the prevention of patent term 
distortion, Integra stops short of taking the safe harbor to the 
limit permitted by its literal language.  The provision permits 
the use of “a patented invention,” which does not necessarily 
limit the safe harbor to the use of products subject to FDA 
approval.  However, by expressly declining to comment on 
whether the safe harbor covers use of patented research 
tools,182 the Court avoided the question of whether the safe 
harbor applies to use of any patented invention.  In fact, 
compelling legal reasons weigh against reading the safe harbor 
to cover any patented invention.  Fear that an overly broad safe 
harbor would cover, and potentially vitiate the value of, 
biotechnology tool patents was part of the Federal Circuit’s 
rationale in adopting a narrow view of the safe harbor’s 
scope.183  However, the Supreme Court, based on the realities of 
drug development and the requirements for FDA approval, 
offered a powerful critique of the Federal Circuit’s view.  The 
better solution to prevent inappropriate applications of the safe 
harbor is to simply read limitations on the types of patented 
inventions that may be used, although the Supreme Court 
failed to provide much guidance on this matter. 
While the Court did not cite legislative history, it is 
important to note that the legislative history is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the result in Integra.  The committee reports’ 
several references to generics do not necessarily mean that 
Congress intended to limit the safe harbor to generic drug 
testing.184  There is no express statement limiting the safe 
harbor to generic testing in either the statutory text or the 
committee reports.  Moreover, much of the rationale in the 
committee reports suggests that the safe harbor should also 
                                                          
 181. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-74 (1990) 
(holding that the safe harbor includes medical device testing). 
 182. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7. 
 183. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 
2372 (2005). 
 184. See supra Part II.C for a survey of the legislative history of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments. 
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apply to new drug development activities.  If a limited amount 
of testing using a patented compound does not significantly 
affect the commercial value of the patent, it is hard to 
understand why it should matter whether the testing is done to 
develop a generic drug or a new drug. 
One might respond that the safe harbor exists to prevent 
patent term distortion, and that new drugs, unlike generic 
drugs, do not prevent patent term distortion for existing drugs, 
as discussed previously.  However, the inclusion of new drug 
development prevents the marketing exclusivity for existing 
drugs from being bloated in other ways.  The inability of drug 
manufacturers to use patented compounds in research is 
problematic not only for timely development of generic drugs, 
but also for research and development of new drugs to compete 
with approved drugs.  A fundamental reality of drug research is 
that existing drugs are important tools for discovering new 
drugs.185  Hence, the inability to use patented compounds in 
research impedes the discovery of new drugs as well as the 
emergence of generics.  This rationale applies to manufacturers 
trying to make a new drug with similar properties to an 
approved drug or to manufacturers wanting to use a 
competitor’s lead compounds in product development, even if 
those compounds have never been subject to the FDA approval 
process.  The ability to use a competitor’s patented compounds 
in research enables the development of compounds with similar 
properties that otherwise might not be developed until some 
time after the relevant patent expired.  The inability to conduct 
such testing would give the patent holder not only market 
exclusivity for a particular drug but also the ability to 
potentially hinder the emergence of alternative new drugs. 
The bottom line is that Congress had good reason to write 
the safe harbor provision in broad terms that would include 
new drug development activities.  So while the rationale of 
Integra may seem insistently focused on the statutory text, the 
Court was correct to read the text as including new drug 
development activities.  This reading is consistent with the 
Court’s acknowledgement of the realities of drug research and 
development in the Integra opinion.  And while the legislative 
history and statutory structure may suggest more limited 
purposes for the safe harbor, neither necessarily indicates that 
new drug development is excluded.  Consequently, Integra 
                                                          
      185.   See supra Part II.A. 
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should not be read as rendering statutory structure, legislative 
history, or purpose irrelevant to interpretation of the safe 
harbor, nor should it be read as extending the safe harbor to 
the far limits of the provision’s literal language.  Rather, the 
opinion should be read as providing for broad but not unlimited 
experimental use of certain types of patented inventions for use 
in developing competing products for FDA approval.  As future 
courts determine the exact contours of the safe harbor post-
Integra, they should account both for the necessities and 
realities of the modern drug development and approval process 
and for the purposes and policies the safe harbor serves. 
B.  SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE SAFE HARBOR AFTER INTEGRA 
1.  Activities Included in the Safe Harbor 
In addressing the scope of activities included in the safe 
harbor, the Court made certain propositions quite clear.  First, 
the safe harbor applies to both preclinical and clinical 
studies.186  Since the FDA requires information from animal 
and in vitro studies for certain submissions, uses of patented 
inventions in such studies fall within the safe harbor.  Second, 
the fact that a particular activity is not included in an FDA 
submission does not remove that activity from the 
exemption.187  The safe harbor is broad enough to accommodate 
this uncertainty involved in the drug research process.  While 
these acknowledgements should provide comfort for those 
engaged in drug research and development, the exact scope of 
activities protected by the safe harbor is not entirely clear.  
Even as the decision stills any doubts that the safe harbor 
provides a “wide berth” for research activities, the Court made 
equally clear that the safe harbor does not encompass all 
research aimed at developing new drugs. 
The Court articulated a two-pronged test to determine 
whether a particular experiment is included in the safe harbor. 
The first prong requires a researcher to have “a reasonable 
basis for believing that a patented compound may work, 
through a particular biological process, to produce a particular 
physiological effect.”188  The second prong requires that the 
compound be used “in research that, if successful, would be 
                                                          
 186. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005). 
 187. See id. at 2383. 
    188.    Id. 
HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:36:29 PM 
742 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.”189  
Evidently, both prongs must be satisfied for the safe harbor to 
apply, but since the Integra Court’s premise is that the safe 
harbor includes new drug development activities, courts may be 
lenient in applying the prongs so that essential steps in new 
drug development are covered. 
Several aspects of the standard are salient.  First is the 
emphasis on particular expectations.  The mere use of a 
compound in an experiment does not trigger the safe harbor.  
The research must be done with an expectation that the 
compound works through a particular mechanism to produce a 
particular effect.  Hence, the safe harbor is keyed to hypothesis-
driven research and does not protect activities undertaken with 
a purely shotgun approach.  That is, it does not protect 
experiments done without any basis for expecting a particular 
outcome. 
Second, the standard requires that the activity be part of 
research that has the potential to produce information 
appropriate to include in an FDA submission such as an IND or 
an NDA.  Not all research qualifies.  The Court left no doubt on 
this matter: “[b]asic scientific research on a particular 
compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular 
drug or a reasonable belief that the compound will cause the 
sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce” 
does not satisfy the “reasonably related” standard set by the 
statutory language.190 
It is not clear, however, exactly what triggers the safe 
harbor’s protection.  It could be intent to develop a particular 
type of drug, intent to take a particular compound of interest 
through further research and development that will lead to the 
FDA approval process, or testing and experimentation that will 
produce information of the type that are appropriate to include 
in an FDA submission, such as experiments to determine a 
compound’s mechanism of action, toxicity, or pharmacokinetics.  
Note that the second prong of the Court’s test requires the use 
of the compound in “research”—not in “experiments”—to be 
submitted to the FDA if successful.  The term “research” 
suggests a whole line of experiments, some of which may be 
preliminary to the type capable of producing information the 
FDA would actually consider.  Given the necessity of such 
                                                          
 189. Id.   
 190. Id. at 2382. 
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preliminary experiments in drug development, they are likely 
to be included in the safe harbor.191 
Third, the test refers to using “patented compounds” in 
research.  This indicates that basic research before the 
identification of active compounds does not fall in the safe 
harbor.  It also indicates that the safe harbor, at least at its 
core, covers research using patented drugs and potential drugs; 
it does not provide a license to infringe any type of patent in 
the advanced stages of drug research.  Although the safe 
harbor provision uses the term “patented invention,” it may be 
inappropriate for courts to countenance the unauthorized use of 
patented inventions other than potential drugs and other FDA-
regulated products, even though such use may fall within the 
literal language of the safe harbor provision. 
The process of developing a new drug and getting FDA 
approval involves several stages.  The Court’s test suggests 
that activities in some of these stages are certainly within the 
safe harbor, activities at other stages certainly fall outside, and 
certain activities may fall in a gray area. 
The FDA requires extensive information about a 
compound’s pharmacological characteristics, such as 
mechanism of action, metabolism, excretion, pharmacokinetics, 
and toxicity, based on in vitro, animal, and human studies.  
Once a company has settled on a particular compound and is in 
the process of completing these studies, the safe harbor clearly 
applies.  These studies lie at the core of the second prong of the 
Court’s standard, protecting research that, if successful, would 
produce information appropriate to include in an FDA 
submission.  The first prong is also satisfied.  A compound at 
this stage has been selected to go through the FDA approval 
process because of previously acquired knowledge of its 
mechanism and effects.  Thus, manufacturers can be confident 
of the safe harbor’s protection at the point a selected drug 
candidate undergoes preclinical and clinical testing. 
On the other hand, the stages of basic research leading up 
to and through drug target selection and validation seem to fall 
outside the safe harbor.  The Court’s formulation requires 
research to have progressed to the point of testing compounds 
                                                          
 191. See id. at 2383 (refusing “to read the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement 
so narrowly as to render . . . protection of activities leading to FDA approval 
for all drugs illusory”); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 
2001). 
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for the safe harbor to apply, so all research before the 
identification of lead compounds is excluded. 
The phases of lead compound identification and 
optimization precede the preclinical and clinical testing phases; 
therefore, this type of research may be a gray area for safe 
harbor applicability.  At these stages of research, a company 
first identifies active compounds and subjects these compounds 
to various modifications to optimize their drug-like properties.  
Although compounds are involved at these stages, the Court 
made clear that not all research, even using compounds, falls 
within the safe harbor.192 
The lead optimization stage involves trying various 
chemical modifications to an active molecule to improve its 
drug-like properties before clinical trials.  At this point, it is 
known that the molecule has a particular pharmacological 
mechanism and effect, so the first prong of the Court’s test is 
probably satisfied.  However, data from lead optimization 
studies may be inappropriate for FDA submission because, at 
this stage, the researchers have not settled upon the exact 
compound that will go through the approval process.  Thus lead 
optimization studies may not satisfy the second prong if it is 
construed very strictly.  Courts are unlikely to do so, however. 
At this phase the researchers have found a promising lead 
compound for further development and potentially for clinical 
trials.  Lead optimization is generally necessary before the 
potential drug can go through the approval process, and finding 
studies at this phase to be outside the safe harbor simply 
because the particular experiments will not be included in a 
submission seems to be exactly the sort of reasoning the 
Integra Court rejected.  Thus, courts are likely to find research 
in this phase to fall within the safe harbor. 
The lead identification phase precedes lead optimization 
and is the phase at which a drug target has been selected and 
active molecules are first identified.  Experiments that simply 
identify lead compounds are not appropriate for FDA 
submission because the exact compound that will go through 
the FDA approval process has not yet been chosen.  Therefore, 
like lead optimization studies, these experiments may not 
satisfy the second prong of the Court’s test.  However, as with 
lead optimization activities, the experiments are essential 
prerequisites for getting to the approval process.  Moreover, at 
                                                          
   192.   See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2383. 
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this point the company has selected a drug target (a significant 
investment of time and money in itself) and thus has a concept 
for a drug to be developed.  Integra could be read to indicate 
that “intent to develop a particular drug” may be sufficient to 
trigger the safe harbor.193  However, based on the Court’s test 
and the opinion’s distinction between basic research and 
research “reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” to the FDA,194 it seems likely that 
“intent to develop a particular drug” refers to intent to take a 
particular compound through development and FDA approval, 
not simply intent to develop a particular type of drug. 
High-throughput screening of patented compounds or 
libraries of compounds are likely to fail the first prong of the 
Court’s test.  With high-throughput screening, the 
experimenter does not know in advance if any particular 
compound will work; this is exactly what the screen 
determines.  Hence, use of patented compounds that are 
selected for the screen for no particular reason is probably not 
within the safe harbor.195  However, if a set of compounds is 
chosen in advance for screening based on knowledge of their 
likely biological effect or mechanism (based on structure-
activity relationships, perhaps), the first prong may be 
satisfied.  Note that the first prong refers to having “a 
reasonable basis” for believing that a compound will work, not 
to certainty or high likelihood.  For this reason, if a company 
has a scientific rationale for selecting a particular compound 
for further testing, the first prong is likely satisfied.  The 
Court’s test favors rational methods for identifying lead 
compounds. 
The screening of patented compounds should be 
distinguished from the use of a known drug or lead compound 
to either determine the characteristics of active compounds to 
assist with screening (as in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.196) or as a 
                                                          
   193.   See id. at 2382. 
 194. See id. 
 195. At oral argument, in response to Justice Scalia’s question about 
whether the screening of different compounds to find active ones was basic 
research, counsel urged that the safe harbor must apply at the screening stage 
because otherwise researchers would have to infringe patents on compounds 
before getting to the research stage at which the safe harbor applied.  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at *26-28, Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 
03-1237), 2005 WL 1106575.  This is a compelling argument given the 
necessary steps in drug research, but there was no indication at argument 
that the Justices agreed. 
 196. No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
HAREID_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:36:29 PM 
746 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
positive control against which to measure the activity of other 
compounds (as in Integra197).  Such uses of patented drugs or 
lead compounds are likely to be within the safe harbor.  
Because these compounds are chosen for their known 
properties, the first prong of the Court’s test is satisfied, and 
the second prong is probably satisfied because such uses of a 
competitor’s patented compounds are the first step in 
developing a competing drug candidate to take through FDA 
approval. 
Note finally that the Court’s test is drug-specific in that it 
is stated in terms of “compounds.”  To determine whether uses 
of medical devices fall within the safe harbor, medical device 
testing will likely continue to be governed by the standard set 
forth in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.198  The Intermedics 
test is better suited to the medical device context (in which the 
test itself arose), and in Integra the Court ostensibly endorsed 
the Intermedics standard.199  Hence Integra seems unlikely to 
disturb the cases decided under the Intermedics standard, 
particularly the cases involving medical device testing.  The 
Integra test is formulated for drug research and will likely 
replace the Intermedics test in cases involving drug patents. 
In summary, some drug research and development 
activities are clearly within the safe harbor; others certainly 
fall outside it.  At the edges of the safe harbor lie the activities 
clustered around the phase when active compounds are first 
identified.  These activities fall into a gray area–the activities 
may or may not be protected.  Whether they are protected 
depends on how strictly courts choose to apply the Supreme 
Court’s Integra test.  Note that the Integra Court remanded the 
case to the Federal Circuit, which in turn reinstated the appeal 
and ordered new briefs to be filed to account for the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.200  The Federal Circuit’s eventual decision will 
be an important precedent and a bellwether on application of 
Integra’s two-pronged test.     
                                                          
 197. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2379. 
 198. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 
1993).   
 199. Integra II, 125 S. Ct. at 2384. 
   200.   See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 421 F.3d 1289, 1289 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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2.  Types of Patented Inventions That May Be Used Within the 
Safe Harbor 
One issue the Integra Court did not resolve satisfactorily is 
whether certain inventions are outside the scope of the safe 
harbor.  The safe harbor provision protects the use of “patented 
inventions.”201  The Supreme Court has held that this includes 
“all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.”202  Thus, 
neither the statutory text nor the Court’s precedent limits the 
safe harbor to drugs or other FDA-regulated products.  A literal 
reading of the text suggests that anything goes. 
Nevertheless, drug researchers should not assume that 
anything goes, for while the plain language of the safe harbor 
may permit the use of any patented invention, all other indicia 
of statutory meaning point toward a more limited exemption.  
The statutory structure suggests that the safe harbor’s purpose 
is to prevent the distortion in commercial marketing exclusivity 
associated with the patents of FDA-regulated products.203  
Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the safe harbor 
protects only limited use of the patented inventions it covers.204  
Nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to create a 
blanket license to ignore patent rights in product research and 
development.  The committee reports state plainly that the safe 
harbor was not intended to significantly diminish the rights of 
patent holders.205 
Another important consideration is the takings clause of 
the United States Constitution, which provides that private 
property may not “be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”206  Application of current takings jurisprudence 
to patent rights involves many legal subtleties beyond the scope 
of this article.207  The basic concept is that patent rights are 
                                                          
 201. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 202. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990). 
 203. See id. at 669-74. 
    204.    See supra Part II.C. 
 205. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 (analogizing the safe harbor provision to the fair use 
doctrine in copyright law); id. at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692 
(stating that the safe harbor would not interfere with the patent holder’s 
rights in the major commercial marketplace). 
 206. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 207. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688 (2003); see also J. Nicholas Bunch, Takings, Judicial 
Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1747 (2005) and Shubha Ghosh, 
Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path 
Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 
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property rights which the federal government may not 
appropriate without compensation.208  The Supreme Court has 
held that regulation affecting the value of trade secrets, which 
are intangible property rights analogous to patent rights, may 
constitute a taking under the regulatory takings doctrine.209  
Regulatory takings occur per se when government action either 
subjects a property owner to a permanent physical invasion of 
his or her property or deprives property of all economic value.  
Otherwise, regulatory takings may occur according to several 
factors prominently including interference with distinct 
investment-based expectations.210  Hence, applications of the 
safe harbor that vitiate or significantly diminish the value of 
the patented inventions used may constitute regulatory 
takings.  Congress considered exactly this question and 
concluded that the safe harbor did not amount to a regulatory 
taking, in part because the patent owner retained the right to 
exclude others from the commercial marketplace.211  In this 
view, application of the safe harbor is inappropriate where use 
of a patented invention significantly reduces the commercial 
value of the invention. 
Modern drug research has been catalyzed by technological 
progress.  The rise of biotechnology in particular has facilitated 
new drug discovery by providing products that can be used 
either as tools in research or for therapeutic or diagnostic 
purposes.  Because the plain language of the safe harbor 
ostensibly permits the use of patented research tools, 
manufacturers of such tools, including many biotech firms, 
understandably fear that drug companies are free to infringe 
research tool patents with impunity in drug research.  This fear 
prompted several research tool manufacturers to file an amicus 
brief in Integra asking the Supreme Court to state 
unequivocally that research tool patents in fact are not 
                                                                                                                            
(2000). 
 208. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 730 (2002) (holding that a patent confers a limited monopoly that is a 
property right); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (holding that 
patents may not be appropriated by the federal government without just 
compensation). 
 209. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-05 (1984). 
 210. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2005). 
 211. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 61 n.19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2648, 2721. 
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included in the safe harbor.212  The brief argued that 
permitting pharmaceutical firms to infringe research tool 
patents would significantly diminish the commercial value of 
such patents because the tools derive significant value from use 
in drug research.213  The Court expressly declined to consider 
whether the safe harbor applied to research tools, stating that 
the record indicated that the RGD peptides at issue in the case 
were not used as research tools.214 
In doing so, the Court suggested a distinction between a 
research tool and the subject of the research.215  This 
distinction is problematic.  Known drugs and compounds with 
biological activity are frequently used in research to discover or 
measure the activity of other compounds.  The RGD peptides in 
Integra and the paclitaxel intermediates in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb were used for these purposes.216  In either case the 
compounds or biotech products are the subject of research, but 
since these themselves are vital inputs of the research from 
which discoveries emerge, they are functionally as much 
research tools as are microscopes, centrifuges, incubators, and 
the like.217  But although known drugs and compounds with 
biological activity are used as research tools in a sense, such 
use is at the core of the safe harbor, at least to the extent it 
protects new drug development activities as Integra affirmed. 
By the same token, the fact that a patented invention is 
not a research tool does not necessarily render the safe harbor 
exemption appropriate.  Consider this hypothetical: a 
telecommunications company develops new technology 
expressly for drug companies to send voluminous research data 
and information to the FDA.  The technology is expensive, so to 
save money many drug companies have their engineers 
duplicate the technology instead of buying it from the 
telecommunications company.  Because use of this patented 
invention involves submitting information to the FDA, it would 
be allowed by the literal language of the safe harbor provision.  
                                                          
 212. See Brief for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 
682093. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 n.7 (2005). 
 215. See id.  
 216. See id. at 2379; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, 
Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL 1512597, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
 217. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., 
dissenting). 
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However, this would be one of the most strained applications of 
the safe harbor imaginable, even though the technology is not 
being used as a research tool. 
Thus, while certain applications of the safe harbor may be 
inappropriate, the distinction to make is not a facile one 
between research tool patents and non-research tool patents.  
Upon close examination, that distinction proves to be neither 
clear nor useful.  Rather, courts should consider a particular 
application in light of the safe harbor’s core meaning suggested 
by statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history.  That 
core meaning is an exemption for using patented drugs and 
other FDA-regulated products in research to develop competing 
products, as Integra suggested with its many references to 
using “compounds” in experiments.  Moreover, the safe harbor 
was not intended to impinge more than minimally on the 
commercial value of affected patents.  Applications of the safe 
harbor to inventions other than the type the FDA regulates, or 
applications that significantly reduce the commercial value of 
the patent affected, are more or less anomalous.  While the 
Integra Court declined to determine whether research tools are 
included in the safe harbor, it recognized that a separate issue 
was presented that future courts may need to consider.  Those 
future courts should take this as an invitation to screen out 
applications of the safe harbor that are anomalous for the 
reasons just given. 
Courts should not feel bound by the literal statutory 
language to permit applications of the safe harbor that are 
unjust, absurd, or otherwise far removed from the core 
statutory meaning.  The statutory language need not be read to 
permit the use of any patented invention; considering the 
statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history, the term 
“patented invention” could be limited to the type of inventions 
subject to FDA approval.  This would not necessarily contradict 
Eli Lilly’s statement that the safe harbor applies to all 
patented inventions.  Taken in the context of that case, the 
statement meant that the safe harbor applies to medical 
devices, not just drugs.  Courts should avoid literal 
interpretations of statutes that lead to absurd results when 
alternative constructions are available consistent with 
legislative purpose or the meaning of the statute taken as a 
whole.218  Because certain applications of the safe harbor may 
                                                          
 218. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); 
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deprive patented inventions of a significant part of their 
commercial value, the safe harbor should not be construed to 
permit such applications as it would raise issues under the 
takings clause.  Courts should construe statutes to avoid such 
constitutional doubt.219  Alternatively, a court could avoid an 
anomalous application citing the lack of a plain statement in 
the statutory text that the safe harbor requires such an 
application.220  Even assuming that the literal language 
includes such applications, the Supreme Court has previously 
recognized that something can be in the literal language of a 
statute and yet not within its meaning.221 
The main problem with these arguments is the rationale of 
the several cases, up to and including Integra, that have 
refused to limit the scope of the safe harbor because of its broad 
statutory language.  For example, the safe harbor has been 
held to protect experimentation with medical devices not 
eligible for patent term extension.222  Integra applied the safe 
harbor to new drug development activities, although the safe 
harbor was arguably only intended for generic drug 
development.  However, these applications were not 
particularly anomalous.  In both cases the inventions used were 
of the same general type to which the safe harbor undoubtedly 
applies—FDA-regulated products—and the inventions were 
used experimentally in research to develop competing products.  
Even if such applications were not intended by Congress, they 
may be regarded as reasonable incidents of the statutory 
scheme.  Courts may distinguish these applications from others 
                                                                                                                            
Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634, 638 (1876). 
 219. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (applying canon to avoid 
constitutional doubt to find that statutes had not repealed habeas jurisdiction 
for resident aliens despite contrary suggestion from literal reading of statutory 
text).  In Eli Lilly, the Court rejected a constitutional doubt argument in 
applying the safe harbor to medical devices.  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 n.7 (1990).  The Court did so, however, because while 
the safe harbor may significantly affect the commercial value of some medical 
devices, it probably similarly affects the value of some drugs, so the 
alternative interpretations in the case did not differ with respect to 
constitutional doubt.  See id.  Certain applications of the safe harbor may be 
distinguished if the user of the invention would otherwise be an ordinary 
buyer of the invention, in which case the safe harbor has a direct, as opposed 
to incidental, effect on the commercial value of the invention. 
 220. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-99 (applying plain statement rule in 
finding that statutes had not repealed habeas jurisdiction for resident aliens). 
 221. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)  
(citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
 222. See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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that seem unjust or absurd, such as the telecommunications 
technology hypothetical discussed above. 
The potential for application of the safe harbor to patented 
biotechnology research tools has led to calls to amend the safe 
harbor provision to remove such products from its scope.223  
However, some biotech products, such as the RGD peptides in 
Integra, have drug-like activity and could be used as drugs or 
as tools to develop other drugs.  When such products are tested 
with intent to seek FDA approval, application of the safe 
harbor is not particularly unreasonable.  Indeed, the 
proliferation of biotechnology patents in recent years has the 
potential to stymie downstream research and seems to make 
application of the safe harbor all the more appropriate.224  
However, if a particular biotechnology product is commercially 
available and can simply be bought for use in research, 
application of the safe harbor is questionable, especially if the 
product is not being used in the research for its drug-like 
properties. 
The most dubious applications of the safe harbor’s literal 
language are unauthorized uses of patented inventions that the 
researcher can simply buy.  This is true for two reasons.  First, 
such inventions can be used in product research and 
development even before the relevant patents expire, thereby 
removing the justification behind the safe harbor.  Second, 
application of the safe harbor to such uses would directly 
reduce the commercial value of such inventions, especially for 
inventions used mainly or entirely in drug research.  That 
would possibly amount to an uncompensated regulatory taking 
and would certainly be contrary to the legislative intent in 
enacting the safe harbor.  For these reasons, courts are unlikely 
to countenance the use of patented inventions for which the 
drug company would otherwise be an ordinary buyer.  This may 
have been the reason underlying one court’s holding that the 
safe harbor did not permit use of a patented culture medium in 
research, although the culture medium at issue was not sold by 
                                                          
 223. See Xiao, supra note 18. 
 224. See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of 
the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239 (2005) (noting that almost one-fifth of 
human genes are claimed in patents); Mireles, supra note 17, at 172 (asserting 
that patents on biotech products could hinder downstream research); Wendy 
Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 373 (2004) (evaluating proposals to address this problem). 
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the patent holder.225 
Because the Integra opinion refused to comment on 
whether certain patents could not be infringed within the safe 
harbor, courts may or may not address this issue.  One case 
decided in the wake of Integra involved patented methods for 
evaluating the safety of vaccine administration schedules.226  
The District Court of Maryland cited to Integra and held that 
use of these methods in vaccine research to provide post-
marketing information to the FDA was protected by the safe 
harbor.227  The court had Integra’s holding correct in that the 
safe harbor extended to post-marketing research required by 
the FDA, but the court should have analyzed whether it was 
appropriate to include such patents in the safe harbor’s scope.  
This was not a case of a company duplicating an invention it 
could otherwise simply buy.  Still, if one company holds a 
patent on a research method, use of that method by another 
company seems to infringe directly on the patent’s main value, 
that being the ability to exclude others from using the research 
method. 
Future cases will undoubtedly test courts’ willingness to 
forestall questionable applications of the safe harbor, and if 
courts are unwilling to do so, it may be appropriate for 
Congress to act.  In the mean time, the Court’s reliance on the 
statutory text in Integra does not mean that the safe harbor 
extends to the limits of its literal statutory language.  To the 
contrary, Integra expressly declined to comment on whether 
certain inventions were outside the safe harbor’s scope, and 
courts have many reasons to fill in this blank by answering 
that the safe harbor does not provide carte blanche to ignore 
patent rights in drug research.  While courts have consistently 
broadened the safe harbor, they have not exceeded the bounds 
of reason, and neither should private parties.  Rather, those 
taking advantage of the safe harbor should heed Justice 
Holmes’s warning that the law sometimes imposes vague but 
real limits. 
C.  THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION AFTER INTEGRA 
One other facet of Integra should be considered briefly.  
                                                          
 225. See Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 
(W.D. Wis. 1999). 
 226. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 
452, 453-54 (D. Md. 2005). 
 227. See id. at 455-56. 
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The dissenting judge in the Federal Circuit’s Integra decision 
argued that the portion of Merck’s sponsored research that was 
not covered by the safe harbor was protected by the common 
law experimental use exemption.228  The Supreme Court did 
not address this issue,229 hence the opinion does not change the 
legal landscape for the common law experimental use 
exemption, which has been construed very narrowly by the 
courts.230 
But while courts are unwilling to expand the experimental 
use exemption, the safe harbor post-Integra should inform the 
debate about whether Congress should do so.  Scholars have 
argued in favor of a broader experimental use exemption that 
would permit the use of patented inventions in research to 
modify or improve upon the inventions.231  The safe harbor as 
interpreted by Integra is, at least at its core, a special 
experimental use exemption for using FDA-regulated products 
in development of competing products.  The consequences of 
this special experimental use exemption for drug research and 
development should be useful in policy analysis for creation of a 
general experimental use exemption. 
Because of the time and expense required to develop a new 
drug, the need for strong patent rights as an incentive to invent 
reaches its zenith in the pharmaceutical industry.232  If the 
pharmaceutical industry can nevertheless thrive with a robust 
experimental use exemption in drug development, the 
argument for a general experimental use exemption is 
compelling.  The value of a patent for a new drug is 
significantly reduced by competition from other new drugs and 
generic drugs, competition enhanced by the Hatch-Waxman 
regime.233  However, the number of new drugs in Phase III 
clinical trials has remained relatively constant over recent 
                                                          
 228. See Integra I, 331 F.3d 860, 872-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 229. At oral argument when the Justices questioned the parties about the 
relevance of the experimental use exemption to the case, the parties responded 
that the exemption was not part of their respective arguments and should not 
be considered by the Court.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at *6, *28, *51, 
Integra II, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 1106575. 
 230. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1615-17 (2003). 
 233. See Dickson & Gagnon, supra note 44, at 421-22. 
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years, while the number of new drugs in earlier phases of 
testing has actually been increasing over the same period.234  
This robust new drug development activity suggests that the 
safe harbor has not diminished the industry’s drive to discover 
new drugs.  On the other hand, it is possible that the ability to 
experiment with a competitor’s compounds contributes to the 
phenomenon of so-called “me-too” drugs that closely imitate 
existing pioneer drugs, although these incrementally 
innovative drugs may still have some positive value.235  The full 
effects of the safe harbor on drug research and development 
deserve further study and analysis to determine more 
definitively if experimental use is a net positive or a net 
negative.  Such studies should help inform policymakers on the 
desirability of a general experimental use exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
The proper scope of the Hatch-Waxman safe harbor 
provision has been unclear because the broad terms in the 
statutory language may not fit with the arguably narrower 
purpose evident from legislative history and statutory 
structure.  The Supreme Court in Integra set the course for 
future courts by construing the safe harbor to provide for broad 
experimental use of drugs and potential drugs in product 
development.  While the safe harbor is wide, it is still limited 
by its purpose and by the rights of patent holders.  While the 
Court only partially described the limits in Integra, those 
taking advantage of the safe harbor should remember that the 
law sometimes imposes limits that are vague but nevertheless 
real, and crossed at peril.   
The safe harbor provision is a seemingly simple provision 
of law that poses interpretive challenges because of the 
complexity of the subject matter governed.  The freedom to use 
patented inventions in otherwise infringing uses has important 
ramifications for the various industries involved in drug 
research, ensuring that the safe harbor will continue to 
generate controversy and litigation.  Careful attention should 
                                                          
 234. See Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 153, 157 (2005). 
 235. See id. at 153 (arguing that these imitating drugs often have 
attributes that distinguish them from the prototype drug such as improved 
efficacy, selectivity, or reduced toxicity, and that the drugs play a role in 
maintaining industry profits and research and development funds because of 
their inherently lower cost of development and risk). 
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be paid to how industry and the drug approval process 
generally fare under Integra’s broad experimental use regime.  
From a policy perspective it is desirable to promote the 
discovery and approval of new drugs, but it is highly 
undesirable to do so by significantly undermining existing 
patent rights.  The safe harbor implicates different policy 
objectives that require delicate balancing and judgment by 
Congress, the courts, and the drug industry, all of whom share 
responsibility for implementing the law within reason. 
 
